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Memory of slavery in the Caribbean is no sporting matter. Nearly one 
hundred seventy years since general emancipation in the English-speak-
ing sub-region, the immediacy of the recollection of slavery still angers 
many in the regional community. It also hinders movement toward 
ethnic reconciliation, and serves to sustain the identity consciousness 
that energizes the rapidly emerging reparations movement. In addition, 
the polarizing politics of post-modern economic globalization that in-
sists history step aside to make room in the popular imagination for a 
mythical level playing fi eld, daily drives daggers into the heart of the idea 
that ethnic reconciliation and reparations constitute a unitary idea.
British Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott recently discovered the 
extent to which passions can fl are when he visited Jamaica in May 2007 
and spoke to a public audience at the University of the West Indies. N e 
speech was hosted by the National Bicentennial Committee on Slavery, 
and Prescott, when pressed on the controversial issue of an offi  cial apol-
ogy for slavery from his government, stated that such an action was 
not necessary and that Britain was concentrating its eff orts on shaping 
an Africa policy to facilitate economic development on the continent 
(Oostindie; Mamdani; Gilroy). He seemed as shocked by the reactions 
of the crowd as by the identities of those who reacted with rage. Jamaican 
Member of Parliament Mike Henry, incensed by this response, stormed 
out of the meeting and described Prescott’s manner as “disrespectful” 
and “condescending.” “How is it that you were prepared to pay the slave 
owners but not willing to compensate the slaves?” Henry asked. “We all 
know what happened and how we feel about it, so why should we enter-
tain this British offi  cial on our front lawns without him being prepared 
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to discuss this matter which is of such heart-wrenching concern to us?” 
he asked of the irate majority (“MP Walks Out”). 
It is no easy matter for citizens and public offi  cials to negotiate the pos-
sibilities inherent in the Caribbean’s future. For most of the Caribbean 
population thinking towards the future requires an intense struggle 
to come to terms with the pressures that continue to weigh on public 
memories and to continue to resist any impulse to gloss over these chill-
ing memories of slavery. Slavery is a legacy shouldered daily by millions 
of blacks who toil for little in the blazing heat of an impoverished para-
dise. Sharply contradictory images of reality continue to generate in-
tense criticism and acrimonious dialogue. “Hell on earth” may just be a 
biased insider image of postcolonial society held by the historically dis-
enfranchised visa seekers to America, but it is as legitimate as the notion 
of the region as an exotic traveler’s paradise. 
N e Caribbean has remained at the center of postmodernity’s big-
business culture, as is evident in the tourism revenues that are the 
backbone of many Caribbean economies. In the seventeenth centu-
ry, Enlightenment appetites called forth sugar and slavery; today mo-
nopolistic Norwegian cruise ships ply its sparkling blue waters (Bryce; 
Pietevse and Parekh). But nothing has exposed the inheritances of his-
tory in the contemporary world as completely as the visitation of the 
imperially designed international cricket tournament, the World Cup, 
which took centre stage from March to May in 2007. Islanders’ tenta-
tive entry into the twenty-fi rst century is not associated with a deep 
engagement with the burning issues of the Internet age. On the con-
trary, the fi rst decade of the millennium ushered in two seemingly an-
cestral discourses: the outstanding, unanswered questions about sugar 
and slavery continue to haunt collective memory, while the business of 
commercial cricket and the centrality of its relation to citizenship began 
a new chapter in the history of the region’s exploitation. In 2007, two 
hundred years after the abolition of the slave trade (but not the aboli-
tion of slavery), the British were fi rst out of the blocks doing what the 
British are well known for—protecting exposed fl anks from approach-
ing threats. N e government in London launched a nationwide series of 
events, defi ned as a celebration of high political morality, to mark the 
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bicentennial of British Parliament’s outlawing of the transatlantic trade 
in enslaved Africans it had sanctioned since the early seventeenth cen-
tury (Farrell; Jordan; Tibbles). By means of early declaration of intent 
the British government sought to defi ne the limits of the debate on ab-
olition and to shape its discursive content. It was a skillfully executed, 
self-serving program meant to defl ect mounting calls for serious discus-
sions about reparations that could lead to positive parliamentary policy. 
Instead, politicians led communities down a triumphal path that sought 
to secure a moral pride of place for a Parliament that acted only when 
it was convenient. But even Prime Minister Tony Blair had to dismiss 
the voices of some academics and cynics who were heard uttering that 
British imperial society had benefi ted more than any other from the 
crime of slave trading and enslavement, and that on this score the self-
righteous should take note. 
It “simply wasn’t cricket,” some Englishmen would say, an expression 
that speaks to the politics of avoidance and concealment where open-
ness and transparency should have been the order of the day. N e busi-
ness of the Cricket World Cup constituted a grand jubilee for West 
Indians who, since Emancipation, have grown to love the imperial game 
with great passion. Hosting the event was a great West Indian moment, 
and was granted enthusiastically, if with some hidden reticence, by the 
game’s global governing body. Following the previous World Cup held 
in South Africa in 2004, the international Cricket Council contracted 
the West Indies Cricket Board to host the Cricket World Cup in the 
Caribbean in March and April 2007. 
N e desire to manage the event successfully within spanking new 
stadia that were custom built as monuments to the excellence genera-
tions of cricketers have achieved, soared above the matter of slavery in 
the corridors of politics and the networks of capital. Sport and slavery 
had collided, and the clash for public attention, and fi nancial resourc-
es, ensued. Communities went to words with themselves; divided to 
the vein they quarreled about the value of matters from the past, and 
the worth of cricket investments in the future. Public opinion shap-
ers asked whether it was nobler in the mind to build heritage sites to 
the memory of ancestors who perished in watery graves or to construct 
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multi- purpose sports facilities to assure revenue streams for generations 
to come (“Mixed World Cup Fever”; Coupar). 
N ese debates seemed to stimulate the public imagination. On one 
side, local advocates of the bicentennial project pitched in with the ar-
gument that the Act of Abolition on March 25, 1807, was the fi rst 
and most signifi cant event in the protracted program of dismantling the 
slavery system. It was, they argued, a crucial blow against the crime of 
slavery that had struck at humanity’s moral confi dence over two long 
centuries. N ey wanted, however, to hear little from those who called for 
reparations, and even less from cricket offi  cials. Nothing was as impor-
tant as the spiritual moment in which moral politics appeared to have 
transcended, fi nally, the power of profi t, thereby closing the darkest road 
modern man had journeyed. 
Batting at the other end was the cricket fraternity. It keenly presented 
its case and rallied its allies around the notion that the Cricket World 
Cup was the greatest single commercial project ever to be undertaken 
by the region. For this reason, they argued, it would be an abandon-
ment of reason to engage in activities that would lower cricket’s rank-
ing on the Caribbean agenda. Slavery, they said, was long dead and 
buried, and reparations discourse would only serve to resurrect its ghost. 
Easily moved to irritation, the cricket lobby claimed vanguard standing 
in shaping the future of a region too easily encouraged to fall back on 
its troubled history. For them, remembering slavery and seeking repa-
rations is all fi ne and well, but not at the expense of attracting interna-
tional investments. Cricket, they said, is not a sporting matter; it is very 
serious business. 
International allies of the local cricket fraternity, mostly based in 
London, suggested that winning the rights to host the global sports 
event and the delivery of a successful product required West Indians to 
present a united management mentality that was warm and welcoming. 
Explicit in this suggestion was the notion that paying too much atten-
tion to the emotive and racially divisive sins of slavery was bad for busi-
ness. It would hurt the host in the pocket, reduce the social prestige of 
the championship, and promote a negative image for the region within 
the global business environment. Communities across the Caribbean 
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region were urged to think big rather than feel folly, and to settle their 
minds on the relative importance of slavery remembrance in compari-
son to the grasping of rare economic opportunities. Expenditures were 
enormous. N e Government of Barbados spent some US$75 million on 
the World Cup project, primarily to construct a new stadium in order 
to host the fi nal game in April 2007. Popular opinion has been that this 
was a necessary and worthwhile investment. N e World Bank, however, 
consistently argued that the Caribbean governments were overspending 
on the project to the detriment of weak, fragile economies.
N e two projects were conceptually contradictory although their 
common historical root was obvious. It was a form of sibling rivalry. 
N e lineage of both converged on the landscape most easily recognized 
as the sugar-cane plantation that had consumed with little care the ener-
gies of countless enslaved persons, and served as incubator of the region’s 
cricket culture. Cricket was not considered a blood sport, but it held to-
gether communities of far-fl ung Englishmen’s voices more tightly than 
language ever could. N e English defi ned themselves as a distinct ethnic-
ity, not by virtue of words or mastering the science of slave trading, but 
by playing a game they alone understood, or cared for. 
Two hundred years ago in the towns where these cricketing cane pro-
ducers transacted commerce, slave trading was easily the biggest and 
most profi table business. As these towns prepared to implement the 
cricket project in the lead up to the World Cup, there remained the same 
expectation that Cup revenues would fi ll taverns’ tills and merchants’ 
coff ers. Sugar cane and cricket shared a common relation to a heritage 
and environment now marketed to English tourists as cultural cousins. 
Linked by a chain of historical events, sons of former slaves and London 
fi nanciers joined hands to corner the sports tourism market in an eager 
bid to remove themselves from the stain of enslavement and memories 
of slave merchants (Beckles, Development and “Whose Game”).
N e University of the West Indies lobbied local and internation-
al offi  cials of the Cricket World Cup in order to establish itself as a 
secondary venue and strategic planning partner. To mark the bicenten-
nial moment, meanwhile, the British Government, in collaboration 
with the University of Hull, established a research center named “N e 
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Wilberforce Institute for Study of Slavery and Emancipation.” It was 
offi  cially launched at No. 10 Downing Street, under the distinguished 
patronage of Mrs. Cherie Blair, First Lady of the State. With the spirited 
acronym, WISE, it is expected to emerge as a site of scientifi c research 
and philosophical refl ection on the subject of slavery and its abolition.1 
However, at no stage during the conception of WISE was research 
on reparations for slavery as a crime against humanity considered a pri-
ority. N e British government had turned its face against any form of 
reparations policy and got its way in ensuring university academic re-
search agendas did not treat aggressively with the matter. One com-
ment, joking but also serious, noted that had this not been the case, the 
institute launched instead would have been “N e Wilberforce Institute 
for the Study of Slavery, Emancipation and Reparations” (WISER), an 
altogether more appropriate acronym given the legacy issues currently 
confronting British society. 
West Indian governments did not ask for, nor did they receive, any 
fi nancial support from the British government in hosting the Cricket 
World Cup, branded by local organizing committees from Jamaica in 
the north to Guyana in the south as the “best and biggest ever.” Fifth to 
host the 27-year-old spectacle, West Indian governments looked to Asia, 
China, and India mostly, to provide grants and cheap loans in order to 
fi nance a US$360 million infrastructure development. Construction of 
internationally competitive facilities sprung up on the backs of Asian 
workers, while advocates for slavery reparations looked to the British 
government to respond, even if only with empty words, in order to heal 
the wound and break the silence infl icted by the most effi  cient slave ex-
ploitation machinery modernity had known. 
On both sides of the Atlantic, however, reparations discussions sur-
rounded the eff orts of both the cricket and the bicentennial projects. A 
concerted eff ort was made by a radical minority in the Caribbean to es-
tablish for purposes of public education the historical linkages between 
chattel bondage and cricket culture. Stories were told about the role and 
function of master versus slave cricket matches during the early nine-
teenth century, about the cultural foundation of performance profes-
sionalism, and of the present-day commercialization of the World Cup 
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games as a sports spectacle. Cricket, so it seems, represents the region’s 
fi nest example of the “up from slavery” ideology that defi nes aspects of 
the African diaspora (Beckles, A Nation Imagined ;  e First West Indies 
Tour). 
N e WISE project, on the other hand, initiated by university faculty, 
but surrounded by a host of pro-reparation voices, mostly in grassroots 
non-governmental organizations, is not committed to revealing to an 
undereducated British public how national wealth extracted from slav-
ery should be classifi ed as unjust enrichment. N is public, long cut off  
by school curriculum from knowledge about the Caribbean carnage, re-
mains protected by a media that sees no value in dredging up the past 
or exposing skeletons in the concealed closets of castles and mansions. 
Within this context the most entrenched opponents of reparations in 
Great Britain, those unwilling to accept the criminality of slavery, seem 
unaware of the magnitude of the slave trade business. In academia, at 
least, the numbers game—head counting the Africans shipped—seems 
temporarily settled, and this has served to focus attention on the other 
issues in the discussion, particularly reparations. 
It is obvious that the magnitude of any form of reparations settlement 
would have to be related to the size of the crime. N ere is increasing ac-
ceptance of the calculation that some fi fteen million enslaved African 
people were shipped to the New World. Also, the lives of over thirty 
million were disrupted by the trade throughout the continent. It has 
been accepted for some time that one quarter of those shipped into 
captivity perished at sea. Slavery was an unprecedented human trag-
edy. All western European nations were participants with varying de-
grees of management success and profi tability. N e Portuguese were the 
largest single shippers, while the English profi ted the most by the slave 
trade (Eltis, Rise and Transatlantic ; Curto). N is trade in persons fed the 
most barbaric system of human bondage the world had seen. Africans 
were reduced by slave relations to the legal status of non-humans. It 
was the fi rst time in recorded history that societies were built on the 
premise that persons were property, chattel, and real estate, with all the 
attendant features of modern monetary assets. As non-humans, enslaved 
Africans were subject to special laws for their public governance. N ey 
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had no right to life; their existence as social beings was at the pleasure 
of owners whose rights over them were eff ectively unlimited (Beckles, 
White Servitude and “A Riotous Lot”; Taylor). 
No other ethnic group was subject to this system of bondage on an on-
going basis. Persons classifi ed as “white” could not be enslaved. Chattel 
enslavement was considered a universal violation in western Europe. 
Although British workers were integrated into the labour market by 
means of several forms of coercion, from seasonal contracts to ten-year 
forms of indenture, slave-like forms of social organization had been 
gradually dismantled during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. 
For the English, then, the African encounter led to a re-establishment 
of a system long removed from popular culture. In order to consolidate 
African enslavement it was necessary, therefore, to fi rst classify the en-
slaved as non-human—that is, outside the parameters of ideas about 
human rights already common to civil society (Kussmaul; Barrowman; 
Rowan).N e success of this strategy is evident in Britain’s profi table 
and “legal” involvement in the slave trade for over two hundred years. 
Perhaps more insidious, though, is that strategy’s relevance to contem-
porary reparations discussions. At the United Nations Inter-governmen-
tal Conference on race and xenophobia held in Durban, South Africa, 
in 2001, the stated offi  cial position of the British government was that 
slavery was not a crime against humanity because it was legal at the time. 
N erefore, its offi  cials suggested, the question of reparations does not 
arise (Beckles “Case for Reparations”). Metropolitan and colonial gov-
ernments did legalize slavery. Of course, the Africans, who constituted 
over seventy-fi ve percent of the colonial population, were not consulted. 
N e Slave Laws, as they were called, that classifi ed enslaved Africans as 
non-human, were conceived and implemented within a global moral 
environment that accepted labour bondage of various sorts but that had 
turned its back on the process of legal dehumanization of workers. And, 
although there was widespread opposition in England at the outset to 
chattel slavery, it was marginalized and silenced by the power of the par-
ticipatory State and its commercial allies.
N e criminality of slavery was fi nally settled during the Nuremburg 
War Trials into the activities of the German Nazi State. N e court de-
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fi ned crimes against humanity as “murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation and other inhuman acts committed against any civil-
ian population, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the 
country.” Since then international law has restated that there is a global 
morality in respect of slavery and that it is no defense to illustrate its 
legality within national law. N e Holocaust was legal in the sense that 
the German Legislature had approved the actions enforced by the judi-
ciary. N e entire world, however, had rejected such notions of legality 
(Munford; Bergmann). It is ironic that the Republic of Haiti, the fi rst 
sovereign Caribbean State, was also the fi rst nation in modernity to pay 
reparations within the context of slavery. When the country secured its 
independence in 1804 from France after a bloody revolutionary war, 
no slave-owning European country offi  cially recognized its status. N e 
United States of America, a slave-based nation, joined in the stance of 
non-recognition as an act of solidarity with France. N e French insisted 
upon the payment of reparations from the new rulers for the loss of 
property rights in Africans, livestock, plantations, and other forms of 
property. N e refusal to pay this reparation meant that Haiti was exclud-
ed from the international community by means of trade embargoes and 
diplomatic isolation (Servant).
In 1825, however, as the fl edging, struggling revolutionary nation cel-
ebrated the twenty-fi rst anniversary of Independence, the government 
took the decision to make reparations payments to France in exchange 
for its offi  cial recognition. A team of French assessors arrived in Haiti to 
value property lost by French subjects, including 450,000 enslaved per-
sons. N e value of assets was computed at 150 million gold francs. By 
treaty, Haiti agreed to pay this sum to the French government. Payment 
began immediately, and was not completed until 1922. N e enslaved 
community itself received no reparations; neither did the indigenous 
peoples who were decimated by French and Spanish colonialism on the 
island (Beckles “Global Politics”).
Historically the concept of reparations has dealt with themes such 
as peace and justice, reconciliation and harmony. It has focused on 
how to settle with the sins of the past and move on to a better life. 
Philosophically, it is rooted in the notions of forgiveness and atonement. 
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N e idea of repairing the damage caused by historic wrongs confronts 
the process of colonial exploitation and enslavement. In instances where 
reparations have been paid the evidence suggests that payment has ben-
efi ted those who suff ered shame as victims as well as those who experi-
enced guilt as perpetrators of crimes against humanity. As a moral and 
political action it breaks the silence that followed the crime and allows 
for human liberation (Robinson). 
N e competitive, recriminatory nature of global economic and po-
litical relations, however, has meant that reparations tend to take place 
within the context of hostile legal tribunals rather than as a result of eth-
ical discourse and moral adjudication. In most cases existing legal think-
ing in countries that enforced enslavement has struggled to accept the 
criminal nature of historical wrongs. As a result, reparations movements 
have been ignored by ruling elites until such time that public conscious-
ness has reached maturity on the issue. 
N e British government continues to reject the notion that slavery in 
its colonial societies was a crime against humanity. In a rather peculiar 
way it seeks to counter the issue of historic criminality by stating that 
were chattel slavery practiced today it would be a crime against human-
ity, a truly strange reversal of logic. N e purpose of this argument is 
to confuse the legal understanding of chattel slavery by including it in 
modern forms of bondage that exist today in Africa and elsewhere in 
the former colonized world while maintaining the idea of its legality 
prior to 1832. In this way, global human rights forces would focus on 
these States while ignoring the historic enslavement of Euro-America 
(Young).
At Durban, the States of Nigeria and Senegal joined the “West” in 
opposing the call for reparations championed by delegates from the 
Caribbean and other parts of the African diaspora. N e President of 
Nigeria, General Obasanjo, seemed more concerned that reparations 
discourse in respect of England could foster inter-ethnic domestic ten-
sion within the fragile Federation. N e slave trade, like any major crime, 
required the participation of some locals, a process that makes the crime 
more rather than less hideous. N e fear that ethnic groups labelled as 
collaborators would be targeted by victimized groups is a genuine one 
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which cannot be treated lightly within the context of African domestic 
politics. President Wade of Senegal, not concerned overtly with the po-
tential internal tensions facing Nigeria, seemed intimidated by the pos-
sibility of a hostile French reaction. He imagined reparation to be an 
antagonistic rather than conciliatory process, and he stated: “What we 
want from Europe is an apology but we do not want to engage in any 
discussions about reparations. An apology will close the door and close 
it forever.” He rejected the notion of reparation conceived in monetary 
terms, and urged instead greater direct European investments in African 
countries (Giff ord, ch. 21).
Of course, European, specifi cally British, investment in Africa has 
a long history. N e fi rst English slave trading organization was the 
Company of Royal Adventurers Trading into Africa; it was established 
in 1663 by the Restoration monarch, Charles II. N is company was soon 
dissolved and replaced in 1672 by the greater and more intensely capi-
talized Royal African Company, under the chairmanship of the Duke of 
York, Charles’s brother and future King James II. N e prospect of vast 
wealth was the vision of investors in the stock of slave trading compa-
nies. In the case of the Royal African Company, the list of shareholders 
is a “who’s who” within the extended family of royals and their aristo-
cratic supporters. Created to supply 2000 enslaved Africans annually 
to Barbados, Jamaica and the Leeward Island, it generated considera-
ble profi ts to the royal family that found expression in the moderniza-
tion of rural estates and the constructions of castles and mansions. N e 
Company’s corporate secretary was equally well known: he was the dis-
tinguished philosopher of liberty, John Locke (N omas; Donnan; Pike; 
Davies). Legal opinion suggests that the British State has a principal 
concern with protecting the royal family from reparations litigation. 
N e most eff ective strategy still used by the British government to 
thwart reparations advocates and protect the royal family is the argu-
ment that colonial slavery is far too remote to be subject to recuperative 
legal procedures. It happened a long, long, long time ago, their legal ex-
perts suggest, and cannot be subject to redress. International law, how-
ever, provides that in the case of crimes against humanity there is no 
statute of limitation. In any event, jurists have suggested that modernity 
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does not recognize one hundred and fi fty years as remote. Caribbean 
families still endure the memories of great grandparents who were born 
in slavery.
Credit should go to Lord Giff ord, fi rst to place the case for reparations 
in respect of enslaved blacks in Africa and the Caribbean before the 
British Parliament. On March 14, 1996, he fi led a reparations motion 
in the House of Lords asking the British government to acknowledge 
its crime. N e Lords, led by Lord Wilberforce, a great-great-grandson of 
William Wilberforce (what irony!), rejected the motion on grounds that 
the experience was a long, long, time ago and that no one was alive to 
constitute a plaintiff  in case of litigation. N e guilty party, he said, was 
not clear because there had been African complicity. Slavery was evil, 
and shameful, he said, and the British government should continue to 
confront its legacies everywhere they are seen, but reparation was not an 
appropriate strategy (Giff ord).
When the bicentennial moment moved debate on reparations from 
the streets and colleges into Parliament in March 2007, there was no 
substantive shift in its line of legal and political reasoning, except that 
this time both Houses of Parliament were occupied by black members 
whose remarks diff ered little from their white colleagues. N ey spoke 
about the need for moral atonement, and suggested that fi nancial in-
struments such as debt relief and fair trade were better options for State 
policy. Greater attention was paid to contemporary wrongs, such as 
forms of cross-border slavery, female sexual mutilation, and child sol-
diers in Africa. Every conceivable challenge facing black States was 
debated while the illegality of chattel enslavement and the call for repa-
rations were pushed to the margins. 
Lord Morris of Handsworth, a black Jamaican and Chancellor of the 
University of Technology in Kingston, who had distinguished himself as 
a British trade union leader and educator, stated: “Well, what a remark-
able thing it is that I, a descendant of slaves, am now speaking in the 
House of Lords on this motion.” “In my judgment,” he said, “we ought 
to do something in reparation,” but we all recognize the diffi  culty in-
volved and the insurmountable nature of the challenge (Hansard Lords). 
Baroness Amos, also a West Indian, shared the view that the matter was 
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legally too complex and beyond reasonable procedure. Jamaican Diane 
Abbot, speaking in the House of Commons, supported the notions of 
complexity, diffi  culty, and historical remoteness (Hansard Commons). 
Nothing was made, however, of the 1995 case in which Queen Elizabeth 
II signed a bill that enabled reparations to be paid to New Zealand’s 
Maori people who were subject to genocidal action and land appropria-
tion by British colonizers in 1863. N e Maoris received land settlement 
and substantial monetary compensation from the British Government. 
N e travails of the French case for reparations seemed even more bi-
zarre. In 2000 the French Government reaffi  rmed its political position 
that colonial slavery was a crime against humanity and made a formal 
apology for its involvement. It did not expect that any of its former co-
lonial citizens or states would legally seek reparation as a consequence. 
In January 2004, however, President Aristide of Haiti, on the two-hun-
dreth anniversary of national independence, offi  cially called upon the 
French Government to repay the 150 million francs illegally extracted 
from his country. N e current value of this sum was computed at US$21 
billion (“Haiti Wants”). It was the fi rst time that a European govern-
ment had received a formal request from a Caribbean government for 
reparations in respect of colonial crimes. A month later, Aristide was de-
posed, largely by means of the invasion of his country by a coalition of 
French soldiers and American marines. Aristide’s successor, the interim 
Prime Minister Gerard Latortue, hurriedly put in place by the occupy-
ing military authorities, immediately withdrew the claim, and described 
it while doing so as a criminal action not intended to benefi t the proud, 
independent people of Haiti (“Haiti Drops”).
And yet, the question of the wealth produced by the slave trade and 
slavery will not disappear. In 2005, a group of British scholars and fi -
nancial experts were asked to answer the question: “If the British were to 
pay the two million enslaved blacks in the Caribbean a retroactive wage, 
fi xed at the lowest level of an English fi eld worker for 200 years, plus a 
sum for their lost assets in Africa and trauma infl icted, what would be 
the sum of the settlement?” N e fi gure suggested by the team came to 
7.5 trillion pounds, more than three times the 2005 current GDP of 
Britain. N e fi gure refl ected the value of slave labour to British economic 
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growth, and illustrates how a small island economy on the outskirts of 
Western Europe was able to emerge the major global economic force in 
the nineteenth century (Inikori; Smith).
Despite these compelling calculations, from the mid-twentieth cen-
tury a conscious eff ort has been made to minimize the role of the slave 
system in providing the capital that nurtured and transformed the British 
economy during the period described as the Industrial Revolution. N is 
has been a necessary strategy to support the argument that the British 
State has no obvious or compelling moral obligation to an Empire 
now dismantled and re-classifi ed as impoverished developing states. Sir 
Winston Churchill, the iconic British Prime Minister, whose grandfa-
ther held considerable West Indian investments, laid bare the facts as he 
understood them in 1938: 
Our possessions of the West Indies, like that of India …, gave us 
the strength, the support, but especially the capital, the wealth, 
at a time when no other European nation possessed such a re-
serve, which enabled us to come through the great struggles of 
the Napoleonic wars, the keen competition of commerce in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and enabled us not 
only to acquire the appendage of possessions which we have, 
but also to lay the foundation of that commercial and fi nancial 
leadership which, when the world was young, when everything 
outside Europe was undeveloped, enabled us to make our great 
position in the world. (qtd. in Robinson 17)
N e contemporary British government, no longer prepared to discuss 
this historical relation to the Caribbean, has successfully bypassed the 
reparations issue and is hoping to exit the bicentennial year without 
any major challenges from its historical past. Success in this regard has 
been a masterful expression of statecraft in defusing what seemed at the 
outset an enormous legal challenge. N e Cricket World Cup also came 
and went; a few comments notwithstanding about high ticket prices for 
locals and their inability to carry food and music into stadia, the global 
media were more concerned with the alleged murder of the English 
coach of the Pakistan team, Bob Wolmer, in a Kingston hotel. N at too 
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seemed a storm in a teacup when the offi  cial medical report confi rmed 
that he had died from natural causes.
N e reparations discourse, however, is unlikely to go away, and is ex-
pected to intensify in the next decade. Former colonial governments 
have recognized the liberalized global trade regimes that continue to sus-
tain the unequal commodity markets so carefully crafted against them 
under colonialism. N e trade rules brought alive by the World Trade 
Organization have created an uneven playing fi eld for Caribbean ex-
porters. N eir sugar industry is as uncompetitive in the new trade re-
gimes as it is possible to imagine, and the banana industry has gone 
bananas as American corporations operating in the Caribbean have cor-
nered the European Union market. N e Cricket World Cup is due to 
return to the Caribbean in 2025. N is time around there might very well 
be an England versus West Indies fi nal, played against the backdrop of 
an agreed reparations settlement.
Notes
 1 Professor David Richardson of Hull University heads the WISE project; already 
it has established a prominent presence in the research network on slavery and 
emancipation.
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